In Print: The Foreign Policy Disconnect October 2006

An excerpt from The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get

Official U.S. foreign policy often differs markedly from the policies that most Americans want. And foreign policy decision makers often express quite different policy preferences than the American public does. …Over a thirty-year period there have consistently been many substantial gaps between the proportions of citizens and the proportions of foreign policy decision makers that have favored particular policy alternatives. On every one of the eight pairs of CCFR [Chicago Council on Foreign Relations] surveys we analyzed, there were gaps of 10 percentage points or more on at least two-thirds of the issues. Overall, taking the eight studies together, substantial gaps existed on nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of all the questions that were asked at the same time of both decision makers and the public. Most of the gaps involved differences of 20 percentage points or more.

We have argued that such gaps are important even when majorities of citizens and majorities of decision makers pick the same survey response option, because they signal that the average citizen and the average official are probably taking quite different stands on underlying policy dimensions. That is, when quite different-sized majorities of citizens and decision makers say they “favor” the same dichotomous policy alternative, the average citizen and the average decision maker probably want (for example) to spend quite different amounts of money on a domestic or foreign program, to station quite different numbers of troops abroad, or to insist on a very different level of foreign threat before using military force.

Perhaps even more striking, however, is the finding that on about one-quarter (26 percent) of all the parallel CCFR survey questions over the years, majorities of decision makers have disagreed with majorities of the American citizenry. To say that officials are “out of touch” or “disconnected” may be to put the matter too strongly, but on a great many important issues the preferences of citizens and foreign policy officials have been quite different, pushing in opposite directions.

The precise nature of the gaps and opposing majorities has varied somewhat from one survey year to another. In 2002, for example, the Bush administration was unusually out of harmony with the public’s wishes on diplomatic issues, including a number of international treaties and agreements (the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the land mines treaty) that the public favored but the administration spurned. In that year a majority of decision makers disagreed with a majority of citizens on nearly one-third (32 percent) of all diplomatic issues, whereas in 1978, during the Carter administration—with its strong record on human rights and multilateralism—there was majority disagreement on only 13 percent of diplomatic issues.

Over the years, however, certain patterns of citizen/decision maker disagreement have held fairly steady. Year after year, economic issues have been a focal point for disagreement, with more gaps and more opposing majorities than in other areas. Ordinary Americans, much more than decision makers, have worried about security of domestic well-being, especially job protection and its connections with trade and immigration policies. In the defense area, year after year, citizens have been less eager than decision makers to commit U.S. troops to major combat abroad, where loved ones may become casualties of some official’s geopolitical calculations. In the diplomatic realm, year after year, ordinary citizens—much more than decision makers—have expressed strong support for international organizations and international agreements, especially for the United Nations and for arms control agreements.

Gaps between elites and the public are sometimes attributed to ignorance, error, or shortsightedness on the part of ordinary citizens, as contrasted with high levels of knowledge and expertise among leaders. We did find a few cases consistent with this picture, such as the public’s misunderstanding of the magnitude and effects of foreign aid programs (a misunderstanding encouraged by some politicians) and the public’s relative sluggishness in comprehending the end of the Cold War. Often, however, disagreements between decision makers and the citizenry have hinged on disagreements over values, interest, and principles. These include the general public’s much greater concern about security of domestic well-being; jobs, health care, and drug use worry middle- and lower-income Americans a lot more than they do Washington officials or Georgetown think-tankers. The same point applies to the public’s much sharper sensitivity to the costs of war: their sons and daughters more frequently get shipped off to Iraq than do senators’ or representatives’ offspring. And to the public’s greater commitment to multilateralism and collective decision making. Some members of Congress and executive branch officials may consider it no fun at all to share power with foreigners, but the American public appears to be willing to do so, for the sake of the burden sharing, the increased legitimacy, and the reciprocal benefits that come with international cooperation.

We do not think the public is always right: poll results are not the voice of God. But it does seem quite possible that a more democratic foreign policy would also be a generally better and more sustainable foreign policy. Certainly it is hard to argue that the republic would be endangered if our leaders heeded the public’s voice on such matters as supporting the United Nations, joining the International Criminal Court, avoiding major unilateral military engagements, stopping arms sales abroad, or renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons. Whatever our own wishes may be, it would not likely have devastating effects on the nation if decision makers paid more attention to the public’s worries about trade and immigration. Better border enforcement, more serious workplace and environmental provisions in trade agreements, and better compensation (from the gains of trade) for job and wage losses could go a long way. The public is not clamoring for protectionism or economic and social isolation, just for some help.

As American leaders actively promote and encourage democracy around the world, a rudimentary regard for consistency would seem to call for practicing foreign policy democracy here at home. In a democracy, every citizen’s values and interests are supposed to count equally. When aggregated they are supposed to shape what governments do. It is particularly hard to argue that decision makers should defy the foreign policy goals that most Americans seek. And to the extent that specific policy disagreements between citizens and decision makers are based on disagreements about interests, values, or principles, rather than differences in knowledge or expertise, we believe that democratic theory calls for elected officials and their appointees to pay attention to public opinion and do what the citizens want. If they did so, U.S. foreign policy might well be more humane, more effective, and more sustainable, as well as more democratic.

Are Policy Makers Out of Touch?