World Opinion and Terrorism

By Frank Louis Rusciano

An excerpt from Global Rage After the Cold War.

It is natural for citizens to react to a trauma like the attacks on September 11 by feeling that they are under siege in a hostile world. It is also natural to seek to partition the world into our allies and our enemies, those “for us” and those “against us.” Absent the Berlin Wall, the borders—however loosely defined—of clashing civilizations that harbor either good will or bad will toward us could provide a comfortable means of ordering and understanding the world and its dangers.

But these reactions oversimplify the way other nations view the world’s intentions toward the United States. World opinion about this country, or about any subject for that matter, is an ongoing process that potentially affects our international image and shifts it in response to events. While an international consensus might arise through a negotiation among the different perspectives on world opinion, the evidence here suggests that such a consensus eluded American efforts [in the months following 9/11]. This does not herald an ongoing or impending “clash of civilizations,” however. Indeed, several newspapers from different civilizations explicitly rejected this interpretation of the attacks. Consider this statement from the Arab News:

The specter of the “Clash of Cultures” as predicted by Samuel Huntington should be treated like the work of a fortuneteller. His thesis in no more than Armageddon dressed up as social science (September 28, 2001).

The Israeli Ha’aretz expressed a similar sentiment within a week of the Arab newspaper:

Public debate was ushered down the wrong lane immediately after the attacks in the United States, the moment formulations such as . . . “clash of civilizations” took hegemonic hold. Thanks to these bin Laden notched up a major triumph: a terrorist gang that does nothing to help the population in the name of which it purportedly murders was transformed by the West and anointed the representative of a billion people (October 4, 2001).

The problem was acute enough for Arab officials to meet in Cairo on October 29, 2001 “to discuss the threat of a ‘conflict of civilizations’ following the September 11 attacks on the United States.” This effort was justified by the concern from delegates that “today the world is burning” and by their desire “to pour a little water on the fire” (Arab News, October 29, 2001).

Finally, a Pew Research Center global study released on December 19, 2001 showed that most people in the United States (52 percent), Western Europe ( 63 percent), and the Islamic nations (64 percent) rejected the idea that the attacks of 9/11 were a result of a “clash of civilizations” between Western and Muslim nations. This rejection was echoed by pluralities in nearly every region of the world surveyed.

If potentially opposing sides in the conflict do not wish to have the attacks interpreted as a “clash of civilizations” . . . why does this danger persist? According to an Arab News article,

The events of Black Tuesday do not reflect the clash of civilizations [Huntington] spoke about. The reason for this is the speedy condemnation of the events by all Muslim countries. But the events themselves are very dangerous . . . and could lead to a clash of civilizations if the zealous on both sides chose confrontation (Arab News, October 9, 2001).

The critical deciding point, then, appears to be the interpretations of the actors involved and the rest of the world that observes their actions. As David McDowell stated, “There is only a clash of civilizations if that is the way people wish to interpret recent events.”

When all is said and done, interpreting the meaning of the September 11 attacks is a matter of choice and consensus internationally—that is, decisions to be rendered in world opinion. World opinion is the key factor determining the manner in which we construct the emerging global configuration; considerations such as a “clash of civilizations” or other interpretations become secondary to this force, and therein lies the danger when dealing with the issue of terrorism.

. . . [A]n international consensus on terrorism . . . eluded nations in the world community [after 9/11] for two reasons. A clear definition of terrorism must precede its condemnation, and such a definition had not been reached. In a related fashion, even the general condemnation of terrorism is directed against a method, not a nation, leader, or some other actor on the international stage. One must recall here our working definition of world opinion: the moral judgments of observers, which actors must heed in the international arena or risk isolation as a nation. When the actors are underground and not clearly associated with any nation, and the definition of the method becomes problematic, the influence of world opinion is likely to be limited, unless one addresses the underlying anger that prompts attacks by state and non-state actors. This strategy necessarily involves going beyond a mere definition of terrorism and its condemnation, to an analysis of the actual sources of weakness and frustration that make it appear a legitimate weapon, regardless of its definition.

Our argument so far has suggested that the antipathies between the West and the particular Muslim followers who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not the result of a “clash of civilizations.” But, to paraphrase Huntington, “if not civilization, then what?” . . .

Several surveys indicate that Muslims around the world generally disapproved of the attacks of September 11. However, there are undeniable problems in the relationship  between the United States and the Islamic world. Bernard Lewis noted in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” that the reaction of Muslim nations to the West, particularly the United States, had changed from “admiration and emulation” to “hostility and rejection.” He traced this change to

A feeling of humiliation—a growing awareness, among the heirs of this old, proud, and long dominant civilization of having been overtaken, overborne, and overwhelmed by those whom they regarded as their inferiors . . . [For] there is something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired, even in the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equaled in other civilizations. And yet, in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred which impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country . . .  to espouse kidnapping and assassination, and try to find, in the life of the Prophet, approval and indeed precedent for such actions.

Many Muslim peoples are thus left only with a “war against modernity . . . [through which] Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment of the Muslim masses.”

A survey of nine predominantly Muslim nations conducted by the Gallup organization in December 2001 and January 2002 supports this analysis, revealing that while citizens in these countries viewed the United States with admiration, they felt that it did not return that sentiment, instead disrespecting their nations and the Islamic religion. Lewis attributed these sentiments to a “clash of civilizations” between the Islamic and Western worlds, but we have already rejected this explanation.

Why, then, would many Muslims feel such rage and humiliation? The answer lies in the loss of international status and identity their citizens and others have suffered following the end of the Cold War.

Excerpted from Global Rage After the Cold War, by Frank Louis Rusciano, published in the United States by Palgrave Macmillan © 2006 by the Frank L. Rusciano. All rights reserved.