Hardened By Conflict: Israeli and Palestinian Views Challenge Peace Negotiators

By Alvin Richman

At the end of November, a peace conference scheduled to take place in Annapolis, Maryland, will attempt to initiate a process of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, starting with an agreed agenda and leading to a compromise settlement of core issues in the Middle East. The attitudes of the Israeli and Palestinian publics present traditional barriers as well as new openings to achieving such a peace settlement. The distrust between these two peoples has been hardened by recurrent conflict; they are sharply divided on several key issues; and there is no single country that both publics could view today as a friend and impartial peace broker between them. On the other hand, both Israelis and Palestinians have new concerns that compete with the threat they perceive from each other. Moreover, both publics now mainly accept the “two states for two peoples” formula.

The examination of these obstacles and opportunities below is based on 2007 surveys from three types of sources:

• Survey firms based in Israel including, but not limited to, the National Security and Public Opinion Project (NSPOP), February-March; the Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Truman Center), June; Keevoon Research Strategy and Communications, June; Peace Index/Tel Aviv University, June; the Dahaf Research Institute, June; and Maagar Mochot Survey Institute, July

• Survey firms based in the Palestine territories, including the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), June and September; Near East Consulting (NEC), September; Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC), August; and the Palestine Center for Public Opinion (PCPO), September

• Multicountry surveys, including a Gallup poll among Israelis and Palestinians (July-August) and a large multicountry study from the Pew Research Center that included the Israeli and Palestinian publics, as well as publics in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East (April-May)

The peace process

Majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians support the Middle East “peace process,” but neither public is optimistic that it will soon resolve their conflict. According to Gallup, 72 percent of the Israeli public said that “in principle they support the peace process with the Palestinians” (versus 24 percent opposed). Nearly as many Palestinians in the poll also supported, in principle, the peace process with the Israelis (67 percent, versus 38 percent opposed). Near East Consulting found a similar majority of Palestinians supporting “a peace settlement with Israel” (67 percent, versus 25 percent opposed).

Far fewer Israelis and Palestinians, however, believe it is possible to achieve peace. Thirty-one percent of Israelis in the NSPOP survey said they thought “it is possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians, while 69 percent said it was not possible. A similar minority was confident (30 percent, versus 51 percent not confident) that the peace conference proposed by President Bush “will advance the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians,” according to the Maagar Mochot Survey Institute. In fact, barely one-fifth of Israelis in the Truman Center poll said they believed a political settlement with the Palestinians was attainable “within the next few years”; three-fourths thought either that it would take at least a decade to reach a settlement (33 percent), or that it would take many generations or they may never reach a settlement (43 percent).

Only a fourth of Palestinians (26 percent) told PSR in September that they expected the November conference in the United States “to succeed in making progress in the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis,” while 67 percent expected it to fail. Palestinian public support for participating in the conference appeared to depend as much on the context in which the conference was described as on the modest hopes of reaching a peace accord with Israel. A 72 percent to 23 percent majority supported “Palestinian participation in the peace conference that will be held in the autumn.” But support dropped to less than half (37 percent in favor versus 57 percent support) when the question wording mentioned the high-profile position of the United States in initiating the conference. (See Figure 1).

Two-state formula and other key issues

Majorities of both the Israeli and Palestinian publics have expressed support for the idea of a two-state solution to their conflict, but fewer on either side have been willing to make the territorial concessions necessary to realize it. Fifty-five percent of Israelis supported “the establishment of a Palestinian state”—up from 21 percent in 1987. But barely two-fifths (41 percent) supported “a Palestinian state on 95 percent of the West Bank and Gaza with Israel retaining the large settlement blocks” (NSPOP).

For their part, a majority of Palestinians supported the idea of eventual mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and of Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people—57 percent told PSR in September that they favored it, with 41 percent opposed. Less than one-fifth, however, were willing for Israel to “keep control of major settlement blocks inside the West Bank in exchange for equal Israeli land,” with 17 percent in support versus 82 percent opposed, according to the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center.

A huge residue of distrust persists on both sides. Most Israelis in the NSPOP poll said they believed that the “ultimate goal of the Arabs” is to “conquer Israel” (71 percent); less than one-third (28 percent) believed the Arabs’ goal is the limited objective of recovering lost territories. The existence of this distrust is no mere fantasy. The belief is widespread in Muslim countries, particularly among Arab publics, that the two-state formula is not a viable long-term solution to meeting the needs of the Palestinian people. In April-May, the Pew Research Center asked publics in thirty-seven countries, including Israelis, Palestinians, and five Arab publics, whether the “rights and needs” of the Palestinian people “could be taken care of as long as Israel exists.” Nearly all non-Muslim publics predominantly believed Israel’s existence and Palestinian interests are compatible in the long term. However, most Muslim publics disagreed, with large majorities in several Arab countries expressing this view—in Egypt (80 percent), Jordan (78 percent), and Kuwait (73 percent), as well as among Palestinians (77 percent). Figure 2 below lists nineteen of the thirty-seven countries surveyed.

Recent polls provide a few findings regarding Israeli and Palestinian views on other issues in dispute, including the status of Jerusalem, the return of Palestinian refugees, and control of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Neither public has seemed willing to make significant concessions on these issues. Among Israelis, 37 percent supported “transferring the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem to the Palestinians, except for the Old City” (NSPOP). Only 27 percent supported “giving the Temple Mount to the Palestinians, while Israel maintains control of the Wailing Wall” (NSPOP), although a small majority (53 percent) in another poll said they would support joint Arab-Israeli control over the Temple Mount (Dahaf). Only 24 percent felt Israel is “obligated to compensate Arab refugees who left in 1948” (Keevoon Research Strategy and Communications), while even fewer (17 percent) supported “allowing a limited number of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel” (NSPOP).

Confidence-building measures

Because Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart on key issues, some area experts have advised that more limited objectives be set for the initial conference, and that it be viewed as the start of an ongoing political process with future negotiations designed to expand the areas of agreement, as well as the list of participants.

Recent survey findings on the Israeli and Palestinian publics’ top concerns and the major threats they now see facing them provide a good starting point for a discussion of short-term confidence-building measures that each side might implement. The Pew Research Center asked both Israelis and Palestinians, as well as a number of other publics, “which countries or groups [up to three responses accepted] pose the greatest threat” to them in the future. For the Israeli public, Iran topped the list (65 percent), followed by Hezbollah (47 percent) and Hamas (35 percent). The Palestinian territories (20 percent) essentially tied for fourth place with Syria (24 percent) and al Qaeda (22 percent). For the Palestinian public, Israel (60 percent) and the United States (48 percent) clearly headed its list of external threats.

However, when Palestinians were asked by PSR in June which of five issues poses the “greatest threat or danger” to them, “the Israeli occupation and settlements” placed fourth at 12 percent, behind “the possibility of Palestinian infighting” (32 percent), “anarchy and lawlessness” (24 percent), and “poverty and unemployment” (21 percent). When NEC asked Palestinians an open-ended question regarding the “main issue that makes you feel concerned,” the “Israeli occupation” again placed fourth (8 percent), behind “the economic hardship of my household” (35 percent), “the internal power struggle” (22 percent), and “the absence of security for me and my family” (20 percent).

It follows that initial confidence-building measures for Palestinians would include steps to improve their economic conditions, and many Israelis seem inclined to help—to a point. When asked last June how their country should assist the Abbas-led government in its confrontation with Hamas, a majority of Israelis approved providing humanitarian assistance (58 percent) and releasing frozen Palestinian funds (55 percent). However, an even larger majority opposed removing checkpoints (71 percent), which clearly constrict Palestinian economic life (Peace Index). Israeli public support for removing checkpoints probably requires an enforceable end to terrorist and rocket attacks against Israel. According to the Truman Center, Israelis were closely divided about a proposal contained in the “American Plan” which called for ending terrorism and rocket attacks on Israel in exchange for Israel opening border crossings, removing roadblocks, and allowing passage of goods and people between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (45 percent in favor versus 52 percent opposed).

While some surveys have shown that a majority of Palestinians believe terrorist actions and rocket attacks inside Israel are justified in their situation, others indicate most Palestinians believe such attacks are counterproductive to their long-term interests. For example, nearly two-thirds in a May survey by the Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies at An-Najah National University believed “firing rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israel” either “hurts the Palestinian national struggle” (40 percent) or “is useless” (23 percent) to that cause, compared to one-third who said it “helps” the Palestinian national struggle. A 63 percent to 36 percent majority of Palestinians expressed support for the “American Plan” on which the Israeli public was closely divided. These findings indicate that a clear majority of Palestinians would support enforceable measures to prevent suicide and rocket attacks if they were accompanied by removal of checkpoints and tangible economic relief.

Negotiating partners

Neither the Israeli nor Palestinian leadership is in a strong political position at home. On the Pew Research Center’s leadership confidence measures last spring, only 31 percent of the Israeli public had “a lot” (7 percent) or “some confidence” (24 percent) in Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert in handling foreign affairs (versus 64 percent little or no confidence). Palestinian confidence in President Mahmoud Abbas was higher—22 percent had “a lot” of confidence and 34 percent “some confidence,” versus 42 percent reporting little or no confidence in his handling of foreign affairs. Each leader would be strengthened at home by an agreement that met the immediate needs of their people, offered good prospects for future progress on core issues, and had the support of major foreign partners.

Unfortunately, no single country or organization enjoys widespread favor among both the Israeli and the Palestinian publics. When the Pew Center asked the Israeli public “which countries can Israel most rely on as dependable allies in the future” (with up to three responses accepted), 87 percent named the United States, 46 percent Britain, and 12 percent France. No other country scored in double figures. When this question was posed to Palestinians, 21 percent named Saudi Arabia and 13 percent Iran, 9 percent each named Egypt, Syria, and the United States, 8 percent named France, and 6 percent named Jordan.

Several Arab countries included on the Pew Center’s survey can certainly be counted on by the Palestinians to be on their side in future negotiations with Israel. At least three-fourths of the publics in Egypt (86 percent), Jordan (81 percent), and Lebanon (74 percent) named Israel among the countries posing the greatest threat to their country in the future. These Arab publics also shared a fairly widespread perception of Iran as a potential future threat; it was named by 27 percent in Egypt, 46 percent in Jordan, and 42 percent in Lebanon, as well as by 52 percent of the public in Kuwait.

On the positive side, nearly half of the Arab publics surveyed in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait looked upon Saudi Arabia as one of their most dependable allies—by far the best ratings received by any country from the Arab publics.

As a peace broker, the United States faces the problem that it is widely seen as too partial to Israel. The U.S. public was one of the few in the Pew survey in which a plurality (34 percent) rated “U.S. policies in the Middle East” as “fair” (compared to 27 percent who said U.S. policies “favor Israel too much” and 8 percent who believed they “favor the Palestinians too much.” The predominant response of most of the thirty-seven publics asked this question was that U.S. policies “favor Israel too much,” reaching majority levels in some countries in Western Europe (France and Germany) and Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia). Perception of U.S partiality to Israel reached 90 percent among Palestinians and was close to that level in every other Arab public surveyed. Even in Israel, a plurality viewed U.S. policies in the Middle East as “favoring Israel too much” (42 percent), compared to 37 percent of Israelis who saw U.S. policies as “fair” between the two sides, and 13 percent as “favoring the Palestinians too much.”

In sum, surveys of Israelis and Palestinians have found majorities of both publics approve the Middle East peace process and the two-state formula for a peace settlement. Far fewer, however, have supported territorial and other compromises on the core issues of settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, and final borders that will be required to reach a final settlement. Agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians may be easier to reach in the near term on the issues of an enforceable ceasefire in return for the removal of transport barriers and revitalization of the Palestinian economy. An initial accord that provided greater freedom of movement to the Palestinians and greater freedom from attack to the Israelis might furnish momentum for progress on other issues in future negotiations. The upcoming conference can thus be viewed as the start of a political process that is intended to include agreements on all core issues and a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas are both in politically weak positions. They need each other and the backing of their respective major partners in order to make concessions and reach agreement on refugees, settlements, and other tough issues. President Abbas and Fatah’s rivalry with Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the perception that Iran is exploiting the Arab-Israeli conflict to expand its influence in the region have added a new sense of urgency in Israel and some Arab countries. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be threatened and possibly derailed by a number of factors, including obstructions by Hamas, Syria, and Iran, as well as by the legacy of deep mutual distrust that exists between Israelis and Palestinians.

But the stakes now are very high: A resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will dampen Iran’s bid to gain regional hegemony, and might set into motion events leading to a nonmilitary resolution of Iran’s program to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Alvin Richman writes and consults on public attitudes toward foreign affairs. He served for thirty-six years analyzing American and foreign public opinion in the Office of Research at the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Information Agency.