Two-state formula and other key issues
Majorities of both the Israeli and Palestinian publics have expressed support for the idea of a two-state solution to their conflict, but fewer on either side have been willing to make the territorial concessions necessary to realize it. Fifty-five percent of Israelis supported “the establishment of a Palestinian state”—up from 21 percent in 1987. But barely two-fifths (41 percent) supported “a Palestinian state on 95 percent of the West Bank and Gaza with Israel retaining the large settlement blocks” (NSPOP).
For their part, a majority of Palestinians supported the idea of eventual mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and of Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people—57 percent told PSR in September that they favored it, with 41 percent opposed. Less than one-fifth, however, were willing for Israel to “keep control of major settlement blocks inside the West Bank in exchange for equal Israeli land,” with 17 percent in support versus 82 percent opposed, according to the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center.
A huge residue of distrust persists on both sides. Most Israelis in the NSPOP poll said they believed that the “ultimate goal of the Arabs” is to “conquer Israel” (71 percent); less than one-third (28 percent) believed the Arabs’ goal is the limited objective of recovering lost territories. The existence of this distrust is no mere fantasy. The belief is widespread in Muslim countries, particularly among Arab publics, that the two-state formula is not a viable long-term solution to meeting the needs of the Palestinian people. In April-May, the Pew Research Center asked publics in thirty-seven countries, including Israelis, Palestinians, and five Arab publics, whether the “rights and needs” of the Palestinian people “could be taken care of as long as Israel exists.” Nearly all non-Muslim publics predominantly believed Israel’s existence and Palestinian interests are compatible in the long term. However, most Muslim publics disagreed, with large majorities in several Arab countries expressing this view—in Egypt (80 percent), Jordan (78 percent), and Kuwait (73 percent), as well as among Palestinians (77 percent). Figure 2 below lists nineteen of the thirty-seven countries surveyed.

Recent polls provide a few findings regarding Israeli and Palestinian views on other issues in dispute, including the status of Jerusalem, the return of Palestinian refugees, and control of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Neither public has seemed willing to make significant concessions on these issues. Among Israelis, 37 percent supported “transferring the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem to the Palestinians, except for the Old City” (NSPOP). Only 27 percent supported “giving the Temple Mount to the Palestinians, while Israel maintains control of the Wailing Wall” (NSPOP), although a small majority (53 percent) in another poll said they would support joint Arab-Israeli control over the Temple Mount (Dahaf). Only 24 percent felt Israel is “obligated to compensate Arab refugees who left in 1948” (Keevoon Research Strategy and Communications), while even fewer (17 percent) supported “allowing a limited number of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel” (NSPOP).
When NEC asked Palestinians which “main final status issue” should be resolved most quickly, 42 percent mentioned Jerusalem, 26 percent refugees, 12 percent borders, and 7 percent settlements. However, 67 percent opposed (versus 30 percent favored) “declaring parts of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian State.” Regarding the refugees, 69 percent favored “return of all refugees to their original land”; only one-third (31 percent) favored one of several compromises including compensation and return to the Palestinian State. Regarding the Jerusalem holy sites, 93 percent were opposed (with 78 percent strongly opposed) to “keeping Israel’s authority in the area of the Al-Aqsa Mosque” (JMCC).
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