After the primary, skeptics once again doubted that the polls were accurately reflecting what was going on. Lieberman's lead was remarkably stable throughout the fall campaign, hovering around 50 percent, while Lamont had peaked at 40 percent, and Alan Schlesinger, the Republican, was stuck in single digits. Some argued that the race would be much closer in the end because Lieberman would be hurt by his low position on the ballot. The theory was that with popular Republican governor Jodi Rell at the top of the ticket, some voters would simply forget to look for Lieberman and just vote for the name next to Rell’s, Alan Schlesinger. And, besides, a Republican candidate, regardless of how unknown and how poor a campaigner, would surely get more than 10 percent of the vote when running against two Democrats. Once again, the pundits were wrong. Quinnipiac final poll had Lieberman at 50 percent, Lamont at 38 percent, and Schlesinger at 8 percent; the final result was Lieberman 50 percent, Lamont 40 percent, and Schlesinger 10 percent.
Again dismissing conventional wisdom, the voters had disproved that there is a generic Republican vote. Once Schlesinger was viewed as a weak candidate with no chance to win, thousands of Republicans realized that party loyalty would mean helping Ned Lamont beat Lieberman. In the end, 70 percent of Republicans, as the polls predicted, voted for Lieberman, and Connecticut voters (as they had in the Weicker race) again displayed their already solid reputation for ticket-splitting. At the top of the ticket Republican Rell won the governorship overwhelmingly, while Lieberman took a majority of the votes running as an independent and Democrats won all the other statewide constitutional offices.
It should be noted that Schlesinger contributed considerably to his own terrible poll numbers. The first thing many voters learned about the GOP candidate was that he had gambled in the state’s Indian-run casinos under a false name—not an illegal act, but not one to endear an unknown candidate to the voters. It just got worse when Rell suggested he should reconsider his candidacy; then President Bush wouldn’t endorse him; and, finally, it was disclosed that he had run up large gambling debts.
Our preelection polls also showed what the exit poll confirmed: that the war in Iraq was not as big an issue in the general election as in the primary. Only 35 percent said it was the most important issue to their vote in the general election. And while Lamont won those voters, he lost those who said other issues were most important to their votes, from the economy to terrorism to health care.
Two other points were also confirmed—first, while most agreed with Lamont that the war was a mistake, most didn't agree that the United States should withdraw troops from Iraq right away; and, second, voters’ concern about the war was outweighed by their concerns about Lamont's experience. A majority said he didn't have the right kind of experience to be a U.S. Senator.
When all three candidates on election night pronounced the final Quinnipiac Poll wrong, they might have been motivated more by politics than any sure feeling about the numbers. All three said the race was closer than we were predicting, Lamont and Schlesinger probably because they wished it were true, and Lieberman because he was afraid his “big mo” would stall short of victory as his overconfident supporters stayed home on election day.
The election also gave pollsters and analysts a couple of lessons that need to be remembered in future Connecticut elections. First, Connecticut is a deep blue state when it comes to national politics. Nutmeggers are reliably Democratic in presidential elections but not so in state elections, and moderate Republicans can be very successful. Governor Jodi Rell followed the Arnold Schwarzenegger strategy of appealing to the center by supporting abortion rights, civil unions, stem cell research, and campaign finance reform. She was reelected by twenty-eight points. Connecticut hasn't elected a Democrat for governor since Bill O'Neill in 1986.
Second, although Lamont lost, many viewed his primary victory as helping energize antiwar voters, which ultimately helped the Democrats take back the House of Representatives. But while there is no doubt that the war in Iraq hurt Republicans, there was no surge in Democratic turnout or a significant increase in the percentage of Democrats voting Democratic, according to the exit polls. The reason the Democrats won House seats was because of the independents who voted overwhelmingly for them.
Douglas Schwartz is director of the Quinnipiac University Poll.
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