Several steps taken by the Quinnipiac Poll put us on the right track in successfully predicting the results of the primary. First, while critics say polls often miss the surge in new voters, our likely voter model tried to find them with questions seeking intention to vote, interest in the election, and interest in politics—and not, significantly, past voting.

Second, we sought to disprove the common misconception that a poll cannot predict a primary if it does not have an accurate prediction of the turnout. Since we knew that it would be impossible to predict turnout (an assumption justified when the old turnout record was shattered by eighteen points—something nobody predicted), instead we made it our goal to predict the primary. We had Lamont by six points the day before the election; he won by four.

Third, we were determined not to be one of the polls that end up being wrong because they stop too early and miss the last-minute shifts that almost always occur in the weekend before voting. As it happened, in this race movement occurred in the final week as Lieberman cut Lamont's lead from thirteen points to six in the Quinnipiac survey. This shift was confirmed by the CBS News exit poll, which showed that the late deciders broke significantly for Lieberman, reversing Lamont’s momentum.

Immediately after Lieberman's loss in the primary, Quinnipiac conducted a poll whose results may have influenced the general election campaign that followed. While pundits around the country were writing the senator’s political obituary, the poll showed that Lieberman, running as an independent, still had a comfortable lead over Lamont. This finding was a warning to Democratic leaders in Washington that while they were obligated to endorse Lamont as the party’s candidate, they should not campaign strongly against Lieberman. Bill and Hillary Clinton, for example, never came to Connecticut to campaign with Lamont. The Democrats wanted to win control of the Senate, and they weren’t about to alienate Lieberman enough that he might consider switching parties once he made it back there.

So, starting with the day he was defeated in the primary, Lieberman set out to be an exception to the old rule that there are no second acts in politics. His primary loss should have been devastating, with Lieberman down for the count. But despite Lamont’s pouring $15 million into his own campaign on a wall-to-wall television blitz, Lieberman's numbers didn't drop by as much as some expected them to, and he retained a double-digit lead that he would never relinquish. And while political pundits said that third-party candidates don't win election to the Senate, past experience had shown differently. Back in 1970, Jim Buckley, running as an independent in New York, won as a conservative, and Senator Harry Byrd, who had been a Democrat, won as an independent in Virginia. And, of course, it hadn't been that long since Connecticut elected an independent to statewide office: In 1990, Connecticut elected Lowell Weicker governor as an independent.

The analysts who said Lamont's primary victory would be tantamount to victory in the general election were also overlooking one important number: Only about 7 percent of all Connecticut voters cast ballots for Lamont in the Democratic primary. In addition, the Democratic primary electorate was more liberal than the entire statewide electorate, which includes Republicans and independents. Democratic primary voters were more likely to disagree with Lieberman on Iraq and more likely to vote against him just on that issue than general election voters. For most general election voters, Lieberman's experience outweighed Lamont's position on the war.

As a matter of fact, Lamont’s victory in the Connecticut primary would come to symbolize what our polls later found out—that voters were increasingly worried about whether he had the experience to be their senator. On primary night, voters statewide had an opportunity to see the candidates speaking on television, unfiltered by the media. For Lamont it was an opportunity to move from the left to become the candidate of the middle ground; but he became too wrapped up in his own moment of glory, and it cost him dearly. As he spoke, the divisive Al Sharpton stood right behind him. That night Lamont failed to make a good first impression with many independents and Republicans, and his momentum was lost. Lieberman, on the other hand, used his speech to go on the offensive and turn the race around.