Diplomacy Challenges in Denying Iran Nuclear Weapons: Opinions of Publics Around the World

By Alvin Richman

In the October 2006 issue of Public Opinion Pros, Al Richman took a comprehensive look at American attitudes toward Iran. The following December, he continued his exploration of opinion regarding Iran and related issues with a comparison of views held by Muslim-majority, Muslim-minority, and non-Muslim publics in several regions of the world. This month's issue of POP features a special two-part presentation by Richman on world opinion toward a nuclear-armed Iran, and prospects for the United States to partner with other nations in handling the problem.

Various public opinion surveys in the United States and abroad show an overwhelming preference to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability through means short of force. Many experts agree that the use of force would be highly problematic, but disagree on what constitutes the best mix of economic sanctions and incentives and when these should be applied. We propose to use international survey data to evaluate these instruments and the various tracks diplomacy could take to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Eight multicountry surveys conducted in the past year provide a means of identifying those publics most likely to work with the United States, as well as the countries and international institutions with whom the United States might partner to influence those that are wavering.

The surveys in our analysis all included the U.S. public. Surveys from Pew and the BBC included the publics of the “group of six” countries now dealing with Iran (Germany and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as national or urban samples from a number of Muslim-majority countries. German Marshall Fund (GMF) and Harris surveys focused on European publics, while the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) included findings from China and India, and World Public Opinion surveys polled the Russians and the Iranians.

This list reflects the large expansion of post-9/11 multicountry polling by U.S.-based firms that has occurred in just the past couple of years. It follows by little more than two decades the major expansion of polling in the United States itself, led by the major U.S. newspapers and TV networks. Analysis of multiple multicountry surveys, like the analysis of multiple U.S. polls, provides an opportunity to gain a more comprehensive view of public attitudes on an issue, to check the impact on responses of differently worded questions regarding the issue, and to gauge the reliability of findings from similarly worded questions. The attitudes of these publics may not reflect the views of their countries’ leaders, whose decisions on Iran are, of course, influenced by evidence of America’s economic leverage, available U.S. military power, and our ability to persuade other governments that they share our strong interest in limiting Iran’s nuclear program. They may, however, serve to constrain and impel their governments’ decisions in ways these other factors might not, and so bear careful examination.

What do international surveys reveal about how their respondent countries perceive the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran? When polled, most publics in non-Muslim countries held a broad consensus that Iran’s nuclear program includes the aim of developing nuclear weapons, reaching two-thirds or more in the United States, France, Germany, and Japan. The Turkish and Jordanian publics also were inclined to see Iran’s purpose as the acquisition of nuclear arms. Opinions in several other Muslim countries surveyed, however (Egypt, Indonesia, and urban Pakistan), were fairly closely divided regarding Iran’s intentions.  

Much greater contrast was evident in the reactions of the different publics to the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran, with opposition to Iran’s acquiring nuclear arms much greater in most countries than the perception that Iran actually aims to do so. Overwhelming majorities in the United States, Western Europe, Russia, and Japan were opposed to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear arms (from 82 percent in Russia to 97 percent in Germany), with majorities also opposed in Turkey (61 percent), Indonesia (59 percent), urban India (59 percent), and urban China (52 percent). The Egyptian and Jordanian publics, however, were closely divided, and a slight majority of urban Pakistanis were in favor of Iran’s acquiring nuclear arms (52 percent, versus only 15 percent opposed).

In the GMF survey conducted in Europe and the United States, the prospect of Iran’s having nuclear weapons ranked second only to “international terrorism” among nine threats presented to respondents. Three-fourths of Americans, and smaller majorities in Britain, France, and Germany (but only 35 percent in Turkey), regarded Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as an extremely important threat in the next ten years.

The Pew Center asked about different ways Iran might use nuclear weapons if it had them. The publics in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were most concerned that Iran would provide nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations (from 52 percent in Japan saying it was likely to 80 percent in the United States). In contrast, majorities of Russians, urban Chinese, and all five Muslim-majority publics who were asked this question believed Iran would likely use nuclear weapons “for defensive purposes only” (from 55 percent in urban China to 72 percent in Russia and 80 percent in Indonesia). In an apparent contradiction, a smaller majority of Russians (53 percent) also thought Iran likely would give nuclear weapons to terrorists.

Among the various approaches that have been proposed on how to deal with Iran, there has been little advocacy for taking military action. Such a step, it is said, would probably only delay Iran’s nuclear arms program and provoke Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces in Iraq. Also, the social and political repercussions could be serious—consolidating Iranian public support for the regime, further uniting Muslim publics behind Iran, and possibly driving Russia and China to Iran’s side.

Most experts recommend some combination of economic pressure and/or diplomacy. Joseph Cirincione favors balancing economic incentives with economic sanctions. Sanctions alone, he contends, will not be enough to lessen the desire of Iran’s leaders to acquire nuclear weapons. Peter Rodman believes the focus, initially at least, should be on building economic pressure and regional security ties against Iran—to obtain leverage and deflate the current leaders’ self-confidence—followed by economic incentives. Most leverage, Rodman contends, is obtainable from a multilateral approach making clear to the Iranian public that the agenda of the current Iranian leaders threatens to cost them a better life.

Ray Takeyh favors diplomatic accommodation with Iran. He states that containment is not likely to work because other countries in the Middle East will not stand up to Iran, and because United States allies do not see Iran as a major threat—propositions that are partly contested by survey evidence of public views. He believes the United States should accept Iran as a rising power in the Middle East and create a situation in which Iran’s relations with the United States are more valuable to the regime than its pursuit of nuclear arms or its ties to Hezbullah or Hamas.

As Figure 1 below shows, several of our multicountry surveys contained similarly worded multiple-choice questions regarding the publics’ preferred approaches to Iran if it continues to ignore UN Security Council demands to stop enriching uranium. These choices ranged from military strikes and economic sanctions to diplomatic efforts to applying no pressure on Iran at all. When this full range of options was presented, only small minorities chose military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities (about one-fifth of the U.S. public, but no more than a tenth of West Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and the several urban Muslim publics surveyed on this issue). At the same time, few in any country favored a hands-off approach to a nuclear-arming Iran (about 5 percent in the United States, 10 percent in Western Europe, Russia, and China, and about 20 percent on average among the urban Muslim publics).

The half-dozen non-Muslim countries surveyed by two or three different organizations on this issue showed fairly close agreement. No more than a few percentage points, for example, separated the results for the “military strike” and “no pressure” options in any of the six.

Clear majorities in nearly every country favored applying nonmilitary pressures on Iran: Americans preferred economic sanctions to strictly diplomatic efforts (about 40 percent to 30 percent, average of three polls), while Western Europeans reversed this preference (about 50 percent preferred diplomacy, compared to 30 percent for economic sanctions). The Russian and Chinese publics also opted for diplomacy over sanctions (by about a 50 percent to 30 percent margin), while the several urban Muslim publics leaned even more to diplomacy over sanctions (about 50 percent to 15 percent, on average). When “economic incentives” as well as “economic sanctions” were offered by the GMF in its multiple-choice question, with no diplomacy option, the results were similar: Americans preferred economic sanctions to economic incentives for Iran, while West Europeans preferred the reverse.

The GMF survey of the U.S. and European publics was the only one to ask about taking military action as a last resort, if nonmilitary options failed to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. In that case, about two-fifths of Americans and West Europeans, but only one-tenth in Turkey, said they would favor the United States or European Union, respectively, taking military action against Iran, rather than acquiesce in Iran developing nuclear weapons.

What did Iranians say they wanted (and what were Americans willing to give) in exchange for limiting Iran’s nuclear program? Overwhelmingly, Iranians (96 percent) believed it important for their country’s economy to “develop the capacity to produce nuclear energy.” Building this capacity was desired mainly because it secures Iran’s energy needs into the future, as well as demonstrating and enhancing Iran’s technical competence. Iranians were not necessarily keen on developing nuclear weapons, however. Most expressed concern about Israel’s nuclear weapons (56 percent, including 40 percent very concerned). Most favored the idea of having a “nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, that would include both Islamic countries and Israel” (71 percent, including 50 percent strongly in favor).

The listed “benefits” that Iranians said they would most like to receive from other countries in exchange for limiting their nuclear program to energy development were “allowing Iran to join the World Trade Organization” (39 percent of Iranians viewed this as a significant benefit), “transfer of nuclear energy technology to Iran” (30 percent significant benefit), “providing spare parts for civilian aircraft” (30 percent), “lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against Iran” (28 percent), and “unfreezing Iranian assets held by the U.S” (28 percent).

For their part, a majority of Americans said they were willing to allow Iran join the World Trade Organization (54 percent in favor) and provide spare parts for Iran’s civilian aircraft (52 percent) in return for Iran’s limiting its nuclear program. A small plurality (47 percent) also was willing to lift U.S. economic sanctions. Americans were adamantly against transferring nuclear energy technology to Iran (79 percent opposed), however, or the idea of Europe “ensuring Iranian access to enriched uranium” (73 percent). (Americans were more supportive of such a deal when adequate safeguards were stipulated. For example, U.S. respondents were closely divided (44 percent in favor versus 49 percent opposed) to the idea of Russia’s President Putin negotiating an agreement with Iran “whereby Russia would provide fuel for Iran’s nuclear energy program if Iran would agree not to produce nuclear fuel that could be developed for use in nuclear weapons.”

Diplomacy Challenges in Denying Iran Nuclear Weapons: Potential U.S. Partners

By Alvin Richman

A systematic examination of eight multicountry surveys conducted in the past year yield valuable insights regarding which countries and organizations can most likely be enlisted to work with the United States in facing the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, and which are likely to have the most influence, specifically on other members of the group of six countries presently dealing with Iran.

Two of the surveys included here asked questions allowing comparison of the overall opinions of the United States, Iran, and other countries (Pew), and whether these countries were having “a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world” (BBC). Overall opinion of the United States was clearly more positive in Western Europe (that is, the United Kingdom and France) and in Russia than opinion of U.S. influence abroad (44 percent positive versus 23 percent positive, on average; see Figure 1a).

Similarly, overall opinion of Iran was more positive than opinion of its influence abroad in each of these four countries (28 percent versus 10 percent, on average). Figure 1b shows that in Western Europe (but not in Russia) opinions on Iran and its world influence were much less positive than the corresponding views on the United States.

Among Muslim-majority publics, the reverse was true. Majorities in most of the Muslim countries surveyed nationally by Pew had a positive overall opinion of Iran and a negative view of the United States. The polarization of Muslim attitudes toward Iran and the United States and the contrasting pro-United States tilt among Western European publics was evident in these “overall opinion” findings: For Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Turkey, a near two-to-one majority had a favorable opinion of Iran (60 percent favorable versus 35 percent unfavorable, on average), and an even larger majority had an unfavorable opinion of the United States (22 percent favorable versus 74 percent unfavorable). The three Western European and Russian publics in Figure 1b had a less pronounced tilt toward the United States: 44 percent favorable opinion of the United States on average (versus 50 percent unfavorable), compared to 28 percent favorable opinion of Iran (versus 59 percent unfavorable).

Several multicountry surveys have tested public confidence in the role of the European Union and the United Nations in world affairs. A German Marshall Fund (GMF) survey found European publics generally wanting the European Union to play a stronger role in world affairs, more independent of the United States, while continuing to rely on NATO to help safeguard their security. Sizeable majorities in most of the dozen European countries surveyed by GMF wanted the EU to “exert strong leadership in world affairs” (70 percent on average, including two-thirds in Britain and France, and a high of 87 percent in Germany). Smaller majorities generally believed the EU should “take a more independent approach from the U.S.” in security and diplomatic affairs (52 percent average, including about 55 percent in Britain, France and Germany). At the same time, majorities in most of these countries also believed “NATO is still essential to our country’s security” (54 percent average, including about 60 percent in Britain, France, and Germany).

The European Union had a predominantly positive image in nearly every non-Muslim country surveyed by the BBC and among two of the five urban Muslim publics (Indonesia and Lebanon). In fact, evaluations of the EU’s world role were about as positive in Russia (46 percent positive versus 18 percent negative) and among urban Chinese (58 percent versus 12 percent) as they were in the United States (53 percent versus 20 percent). The European Union (as well as Britain and France individually) had a much more positive image in Russia and China than did either the United States or Iran. Impressions of France’s influence in the world, specifically, were particularly positive in Russia (63 percent) and among urban Chinese (62 percent) and Lebanese (60 percent) and closely divided in the United States, but very negative in Turkey (9 percent positive versus 69 percent negative).

The United Nations appears to have more credibility in dealing with Iran than any other international institution. When GMF asked twelve European publics which body could “best handle the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons”—the UN, EU, NATO, or the United States—the United Nations took top honors in every country except Turkey. Forty-three percent on average mentioned the UN, followed by the EU (19 percent), NATO (15 percent), and the United States (8 percent). In Britain, France, and Germany, about half of the publics named the UN as best able to deal with Iran. The U.S. public also ranked the UN as best able to handle Iran (36 percent), followed by the United States (22 percent), NATO (18 percent), and the EU (13 percent).

In Pew’s multiregion survey, the image of the United Nations was predominantly favorable in nearly every non-Muslim country and among two of the five Muslim publics (Indonesia and urban Pakistan). Western Europeans, Russians, and urban Chinese, as well as all of the Muslim-majority publics surveyed, had a more favorable opinion of the UN than of the United States.

The Chicago Council survey found support for a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities rose to an appreciable level in China and India if “the UN authorizes the strike” and other countries agreed to participate.

World Public Opinion asked Iranians whether the United Nations is having a “mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world.” A 58 percent to 24 percent majority said positive, which is more favorable than Iranian views of Europe (48 percent positive) or Russia (44 percent), but less favorable than their views of Japan (61 percent) or India (60 percent). Iranians also were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that “the use of military force is more legitimate when the United Nations approves it.” A 69 percent to 22 percent majority of Iranians agreed—nearly as large as the 72 percent to 27 percent majority of Americans who agreed on this question.

All in all, what do the eight international surveys in our analysis tell us about the responding publics’ views concerning a nuclear-armed Iran, and about the potential of their respective countries to partner with the United States in dealing with the prospect?

United States

On a number of questions examined here, the United States was an outlier among the publics polled in these eight surveys. Americans were among the publics most concerned about a nuclear-armed Iran and were the most inclined to take a tough approach toward Iran. They took a backseat, however, to Western European publics when it came to distrust of Iran and its international behavior and trust in the mechanisms of the United Nations to check Iran.

Western Europe

Three-fourths or more of the publics in Britain, France, and Germany viewed Iran as having a negative influence in the world, more than the 63 percent in the United States holding this view.

Further, these publics were nearly as distrustful as Americans about the aims of Iran’s nuclear program and expressed similar overwhelming opposition (about 90 percent) to Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons.

They were nearly as supportive as Americans of military action against Iran, if nonmilitary options fail to prevent its developing nuclear weapons (about two-fifths in favor).

Western Europeans were just as convinced as Americans that NATO remains “essential” to their security (about three-fifths on both sides of the Atlantic), but more confident than Americans about the role the UN can play in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program.

In sum, the attitudes of Western Europeans make them natural allies of the United States in attempting to deny Iran nuclear weapons. What gives their involvement special significance is their countries’ good standing and potential influence with Russia and China, the two non-Western powers in the “group of six” dealing with Iran. The Russian and Chinese publics had very positive views of Britain, France, and Germany, but mixed overall opinions of the United States, and clearly negative views of U.S. influence abroad.

Russia and China

Russians and urban Chinese had nearly as negative impressions of Iran’s international role as that of the U.S. role abroad (see tables above). Pluralities in Russia and China doubted Iran’s claim that its nuclear program was focused solely on energy development. Majorities of Russians and urban Chinese were opposed to Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons, although this was below the very high levels of opposition obtained in Western Europe and the United States. The differences were even greater in their publics’ perceptions of why Iran wants nuclear weapons: Most Russians and Chinese believed Iran wants them primarily for “defensive purposes only.” In contrast, most Western publics believed a nuclear-armed Iran would be likely to attack Israel and provide nuclear weapons to terrorists.

Muslim-majority countries

On the whole, the Muslim publics examined in these surveys had the most positive images of Iran and the most negative images of the United States compared to the non-Muslim publics studied; they were the least suspicious that Iran’s nuclear program was intended to produce nuclear weapons; and they were far more likely than most non-Muslim publics to believe Iran would use nuclear weapons “for defensive purposes only.” Nevertheless, urban majorities in several Muslim countries (Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey) said they would be at least somewhat concerned if Iran did develop nuclear weapons. And pluralities in four out of five Muslim countries (Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, and Turkey, but not urban Pakistan) believed a nuclear-armed Iran would be emboldened to attack Israel.

Among the Muslim publics surveyed, the Turks and Indonesians were the most opposed to Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons. The Turks were the Muslim public most inclined to believe Iran is developing nuclear weapons and the only one surveyed to express a predominantly negative view of Iran’s influence in the world (13 percent positive versus 46 percent negative). At the same time, the Turks had an even more negative view of the U.S. international role—in fact, more negative than any other Muslim public surveyed (7 percent positive versus 69 percent negative). Urban Pakistanis were the Muslim public least opposed to Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons and most likely to have a benign view of Iran’s motives: They were the least likely to believe an Iran with nuclear weapons would provide these weapons to terrorists or be emboldened to attack Israel or countries in Europe.

Limited survey data from urban samples in Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates show that these two publics had a more positive view of the U.S. international role than the other urban Muslim publics surveyed (about 30 percent positive, compared to 15 percent positive). Majorities of all the urban Muslim publics surveyed by the BBC held a predominantly negative view of U.S. world influence (ranging from 57 percent in the UAE and 58 percent in Lebanon to 71 percent in Indonesia). In contrast, fewer than half of each of these publics viewed Iran’s international influence negatively (ranging from 18 percent in Egypt to 46 percent in Turkey).

The continued polarization of the Muslim publics’ attitudes toward Iran and the United States highlights the dual challenge facing the West in attempting to peel away Muslim societies from Iran’s side of the confrontation over its nuclear program, while holding the support of their governments.

In contrast, the congruence of the U.S. and Western European publics’ views on Iran and its nuclear threat offers opportunities for our countries to work together in dealing with Iran and to negotiate collectively with Russia and China and within the U.N. to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

All writers on the subject agree that the Iranian leadership is not monolithic. The radicals who have been ascendant during the past year appear to view both a nuclear program and anti-Americanism as useful tools to consolidate power at home and extend Iran’s influence abroad. They may not want to strike a deal with the United States. However, they could not easily ignore strong economic and diplomatic pressures on Iran exerted openly and multilaterally by the United States along with major EU powers, Russia, and China. The publics in these countries are united in their opposition to Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons and in their desire to resolve this issue without resorting to the use of military force. Whether it can be resolved without resorting to force may depend on the severity and impact of the nonmilitary pressure the group of six is able to apply collectively.

Alvin Richman writes and consults on public attitudes toward foreign affairs. He served for thirty-six years analyzing American and foreign public opinion in the Office of Research at the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Information Agency.

Surveys in the Analysis

Countries represented by urban-only or largely urban samples are indicated by italics.

(1) The Pew Research Center (Pew), March-May 2006. Taken in fifteen countries, including all members of the group of six now dealing with Iran (United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China), India, Japan, and five Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey);

(2) The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), June 2006. Taken in the United States, Turkey, Britain, France, Germany, and eight other European countries;

(3) The Chicago Council on Global Relations (CCGR), June-July 2006. Taken in five countries, including the United States, China, and India;

(4) BBC/PIPA-Globescan (BBC), May-July 2006. Taken in twenty-five countries, including the group of six (urban sample in China) and several Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey);

(5) BBC/PIPA-Globescan (BBC), November 2006-January 2007. Taken in twenty-seven countries, including the group of six (urban sample in China), and several Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Lebanon, Turkey, and the UAE);

(6) Harris International, November-December 2006. Taken in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany;

(7) World Public Opinion (WPO), October-December 2006. Taken in the United States and Iran;

(8) World Public Opinion (WPO), April 2006. Taken in the United States and Russia.

Additional Reading

Cirincione, Joseph, and Andrew Grotto. 2007. Contain and engage: A new strategy for resolving the nuclear crisis with Iran. Center for American Progress.

Rodman, Peter W. 2007. Countering Iran’s revolutionary challenge. The Brookings Institution.

Takeyh, Ray. 2007. Time for détente with Iran. Foreign Affairs  (March/April).