Adventure in Baku By Warren Mitofsky and Joe Lenski page 4

How did the results from the three exit polls and those of the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan compare? The media generally gave credibility to the USAID exit poll even though it was funded by the U.S. government, an open supporter of stability and the current Azerbaijan government. The United States also urged fair elections on President Alyiev. No one questioned the integrity of PA Consulting, the lead organization conducting the USAID poll.

A comparison of the results from all three exit polls and the election commission shows relative agreement about winners in 112 districts, and disparities in 10 of the other 13. The USAID and Mitofsky/Edison/CESSI exit polls show many similar results. The only difficulty with this comparison is that USAID only polled in 65 of the 125 districts. Their random selection of districts missed five key districts (9, 20, 21, 31, and 36) where opposition leaders were expected to offer strong challenges. Our exit poll had opposition candidates winning two of these districts—9 and 31—which differed with the original election commission count. In District 20 we agreed with the official vote count showing that the opposition candidate came in a strong second. District 21 was a close three-way race in our exit poll, while the official count showed a clear winner. In District 36 our results were based upon contradictory data, making it hard to reach a clear conclusion.

The Saar Poll seems to have sampled a different universe of voters. In ten districts they reported votes for candidates who were not on the ballot. They also had an exit poll for district 122, which, we were told by the election commission, would not have any voting at the polling places. Saar’s most disturbing reporting was their winner projections in all but one of the districts where we differed with the election commission. That included District 9, where the election commission overturned its initial declaration of a winner. Somehow, Saar got the same winner as the election commission even when our exit poll, and sometimes the USAID exit poll, showed a different candidate.

One should never go through an experience like this without taking away something for the future. The number one lesson here is that public polling is difficult to do for organizations other than the media and for organizations that have a long history of publication of survey results, regardless of the direction of the findings. This criterion is met in the United States by foundations that sponsor polls, many government agencies, and private companies. However, if one chooses to work, as we did, for organizations with no known record for open availability of the survey findings, caveat emptor. What we had thought was a clear understanding of our plan to publish at poll closing was the start of a negotiating position for our sponsors. We had to struggle to make our report public. In the end we succeeded, but it would have been much timelier had it been released when the polls closed.

The monitors we hired to check the work of the interviewers were an invaluable addition to our peace of mind about what we were reporting. Without them we might have been misled by the bogus reporting from ACSDA supervisors in key districts.

What is unclear to us is why we were hired to do exit polls. We thought the Azerbaijan elections would be fair and transparent. Otherwise, no one would hire us, knowing we would identify questionable vote-counting. The people who hired us must have thought the election would be fair. At least, that is what we would like to believe.