When the Trains Exploded in Madrid: Fear, Anger, Public Opinion, and Government Change

By Kenneth A. Rasinski, Tom W. Smith, and Juan Díez-Nicolás

On March 11th, 2004, the city of Madrid suffered terrorist attacks that exacted a considerable toll on human life. During rush hour that morning, ten explosive devices were detonated within three minutes of each other aboard commuter trains, resulting in nearly 200 dead and over 1,400 wounded. There were similarities between the Spanish attacks and the ones that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001. Both were perpetrated by Islamic militants (presumably al-Qaeda members), and both involved transportation systems.

The political fallout, however, was much different in the two countries. President George W. Bush, whose popularity was waning, was able to use the 9/11 attacks as a rallying point for his administration. In Spain, the incumbent Popular Party (PP) was voted out of office after the Madrid attacks, which occurred three days before the March 14 Spanish national elections. While there was no apparent political motivation for the Spanish attacks, the effects for the PP were devastating.

According to a March 9, 2005, Associated Press report, the bombings “vaulted” the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, or PSOE) to power and gave the favored PP an “unexpected” loss. How favored was the PP and how unexpected was this loss? Well before the elections, the Spanish public expressed extreme opposition to Spain’s involvement with the United States in the war in Iraq, with 85 percent opposed in November 2003. But, as reported by the New York Times that December, the PP kept most of its seats in regional and municipal legislatures held after the fall of Baghdad, suggesting a change in support for the party’s foreign policy and giving the administration hope for a victory in the national election.

Actual results of the municipal elections of 2003 suggest a less optimistic interpretation. When elected deputies to town councils were considered (Table 1), the PP exceeded the PSOE, but only by 423 deputies. Compared to the 1999 municipal elections, the PP lost about 1,000 deputies while the PSOE gained almost 1,300. Circumstances prevailing before the Madrid terrorist attacks, including opposition to the Iraq war, may have already placed the PP in a precarious position.

Table 1

Number of Elected Deputies to Town Councils for PP and PSOE

1999 and 2003 Municipal Elections

A survey funded by the National Science Foundation and conducted in May 2004 as part of a monthly poll by Analysis Sociologicos, Economicos, y Politicos (ASEP) in Spain examined the psychological reactions and personal and political concerns associated with the attacks. Typically, the ASEP uses a national sample only. In this case, an oversample of residents of Madrid was included so that comparisons to the national sample could be made.

We attempted to use the data to explore as closely as possible the relationship between public reactions to the event and respondents’ vote choices in the subsequent election. To put Spaniards’ responses into larger context, we then compared them with results from two other surveys involving national disasters, one examining American reactions to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and one looking at American reactions to the November 1963 assassination of U.S. president John F. Kennedy. We hoped that the comparisons could help us understand Spanish response to the Madrid attacks beyond what we could see by looking within.